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EARL WARREN, THE "WARREN COURT,"
AND THE WARREN MYTHS
Philip B. Kurland*

Stt"

is not enough for the knight of romance," Justice Holmes
once reminded us, "that you agree that his lady is a very nice
girl-if you do not admit that she is the best that God ever made or
will make, you must fight."' So, too, with the admirers of the Chief
Justice and their "fair lady." For the moment, Earl Warren is enjoying the lavish praise that is not uncommonly ladled out when a man
voluntarily decides to end a long and important government career.
The contents of this issue of the MichiganLaw Review may be taken
as representative of the prevalent attitude, especially in the law
school world, about the greatness of Chief Justice Warren.
Indeed, it was clear from the tone of the invitation to participate
in this Symposium that the editors were requesting me to play a part
in a sort of secular canonization of the great man, and that my role
was to be that of the devil's advocate. As an amateur in canon history, I have been unable to discover an instance in which the devil's
advocate has prevailed. I assume, therefore, that the function I am
expected to fulfill is that of making out a good case against the
miracles that Warren is supposed to have performed, but not a good
enough case to be convincing. Thus, I must align myself neither
with President Eisenhower's rumored reference to his appointment
of Warren as the "biggest damfool mistake I ever made" 2 nor with
President Johnson's assessment of Warren as "the greatest Chief
Justice of them all."3 My proposition here is rather that Warren is
deserving neither of the simpering adulation of his admirers nor of
the vitriolic abuse of his detractors. It is too early to sanctify him.
I should say early on, however, that if a "great Chief Justice" is
one who has presided over a Court that has written, rewritten, and
repealed large segments of the law of the land-constitutional as
well as statutory and judicial-then Warren clearly qualifies for
the accolade. If, on the other hand, reliance is to be placed on
Warren's individual contributions to American jurisprudence as revealed in his opinions, it will be difficult indeed to justify such
laurels.
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The Warren myths, I submit, whether one finds them in the
vast demonology or extensive hagiography devoted to the subject, are
dependent upon identification of the Chief Justice with the institution over which he presides, an identification that has not been valid
since the time of John Marshall, if it was valid then. A Chief Justice,
despite the public image, has little authority that is not shared by his
colleagues on the Court, except that which inheres in his personal
capacities. Harlan Stone, for example, lent no more direction to the
Court's actions as Chief Justice than he did as an Associate Justice.
The Chief Justice of the United States differs in function from
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in that he is treated as
the senior member of the Court no matter how short his tenure and,
therefore, assigns the opinions when he is a member of the majority.
And he presides at the conferences and during the presentations of
oral arguments. It is certainly true that a strong Chief Justice can
use these roles as devices for framing the issues to which the Court
will address itself, but that function has as often been performed by
an occupant of a side chair as by the possessor of the center chair.
There is no evidence that Warren's influence has extended beyond the power of the one vote that is conferred upon him as a
member of the Court. Unlike Stone and Charles Evans Hughes
before him, Warren can hardly be regarded as the intellectual or
forensic superior of any of his brethren. Indeed, a far more accurate
estimate is that Warren has not formed the Court but rather that the
Court has formed him. Certainly Warren the Chief Justice has
revealed a very different set of values than did Warren the district
attorney, Warren the state attorney general, or Warren the governor.
As a district attorney and attorney general in California, he engaged in and endorsed the very prosecutorial practices that the
"Warren Court" has so thoroughly condemned: extorting confessions, although allegedly not by physical violence; depriving indigents of counsel, although allegedly not at trial; bugging homes and
offices and conducting illegal searches and seizures, although, it is
said, the illegally secured evidence was not used at trial.4 Nor, during
this period, did he abstain from the kind of Red-baiting that characterized the McCarthy era. 5 As Governor of California he led the
racist attack that resulted in the evacuation of the Japanese-Americans from the 'est Coast.6 And, he successfully fought legislative re4. Id. at 76-94.
5. Id. at 62-75.
6. Id. at 105-14.
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apportionment 7 that would have brought his state closer to the simplistic "one man-one vote" formula that he later thought should
be imposed on all states, not merely as a desirable standard but
rather as a constitutionally compelled one.8 It is readily evident that
the Supreme Court gave the new values to the Chief Justice; he
certainly did not impose his standards upon the Court.
A second of the Warren myths is dependent on the proposition
that his genial personality-and there is none who would deny him
this-has been a cohesive force, drawing together the disparate views
of his brethren into a unified whole. Unfortunately, the facts are
to the contrary. Under Warren's presidency, the Court has been the
most divided, if not the most divisive, in American history. A glance
at a few statistics will make this point clear.
A comparison of the last five years of the Warren Court (excluding the 1967 term) with the last five-year period in the life of
the equally embattled New Deal Court of the "Nine Old Men,"
which included such noteworthy dissenters as Justices Brandeis,
Stone, and Cardozo, reveals the following:
"The Warren Court"

"The Nine Old Men"

Term

Concur- DissentMajority
ring
ing
Opinions Opinions Opinions

1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1956-37

168
158
156
146
149

1
4
1
3
1

17
18
14
20
17

Totals

777

10

Average

155

2

Term
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67

ConcurMajority
ring
Opinions Opinions

Dissenting
Opinions

117
127
101
107
119

40
s0
46
37
26

76
77
71
74
97

86

571

179

395

17

114

36

79

If one looks only at the-dissenting votes, the figures are these:
"The Nine Old Men"

"The Warren Court"

Term

Dissenting
Votes

Number of
Cases

Term

Dissenting
Votes

Number of
Cases

1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37

70
67
60
76
78

168
158
156
146
149

1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67

234
320
173
168
322

117
127
101
107
119

Totals

351

777

1217

571

70

155

243

114

Average

7. Id. at 239-42.
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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This is not to suggest that there is anything wrong with a Court
that chooses to express individual views by way of concurring and
dissenting opinions and dissenting votes. It is offered only to indicate that the Chief Justice was perhaps not the great conciliating
force that so many have suggested him to be.
This particular Warren myth, as indeed almost all of them,
began with the unanimous opinion in the first of the school desegregation cases, Brown v. Board of Education.9 The argument assumes
that Warren is responsible, if not for the judgment in that case and
its companions, at least for the unanimity with which the judgment
was announced. It takes no occult powers to recognize that the
Brown decision was the result of a careful, step-by-step process in
which Warren participated only at the ultimate stage of authoring
the Brown opinion-a step that would have been taken even with
Fred Vinson still occupying the office of Chief Justice. Nor was the
presence of Warren on the Supreme Court and that tribunal's
unanimity any more than coincidental. It is safe to say that the
facade of unanimity was due at least as much to the persuasive capacities of Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter as to the benign presence of Earl Warren. (Perhaps, however, it may be said that Warren's
visit to Justice Jackson while the latter was in the hospital with a
heart attack was designed to prevent the filing of a separate opinion
by Jackson.)
Warren's "greatness" depends, therefore, upon the erroneous
identification of the Chief Justice with the institution over which he
presides, as if a Chief Justice is responsible for the work of the Court
as a President is held responsible for the actions of all his subordinates in the executive branch. That this is an erroneous concept of
the Chief Justice's role should be clear. That it is the public concept,
however, has only recently been underlined by the confirmation
hearings and Senate debate on the nomination of Associate Justice
Fortas to the Chief Justiceship. 10 And so, because the error is so
pervasive, history may well measure Warren's place by the work of
the Court on which he served rather than by his individual contributions to constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, a quick look at the work
of the Court may be in order.
The acclaim for the Warren Court rests largely on five areas of
its work: the school desegregation cases, 1 the criminal procedure
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1968, § 2, at 53, col. 7.
11. See Carter, The Warren Court and Desegreation, 67 Mica. L. REv. 237 (1968).
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cases, 12 the reapportionment cases, 13 the church-state cases, 14 and the
obscenity cases.15 I shall not touch upon the last because in that area
Warren was more likely to be found on the side of censorship than
against it.
I think that few but racial or religious bigots would reject the
objectives of the Court in the school desegregation cases and the
church-state cases. Objections to the reapportionment decisions may
rest either on different philosophies of democracy than that of the
Levellers,' 6 or on notions of the impropriety and lack of wisdom in
the Court's intervention in this political area. 1 And only a tyrant
would object to the goals of due process that underlie the criminal
procedure cases, however much legitimate exception may be taken to
the Court's methods of securing these goals. In short, the Court's
good intentions cannot be gainsaid. Indeed, if, as has been suggested,
the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the Warren Court has
been among the great roadbuilders of all time.
History, however, has a nasty way of measuring greatness in terms
of success rather than in terms of goodness. Marshall, for example, is
applauded because his Court contributed to the centralization of
governmental power at a time when the centrifugal philosophy of
Jeffersonian democracy might have destroyed the nation or kept it
from coming into being. Roger Taney, on the other hand, has gone
down in infamy, despite some noteworthy contributions to American
constitutional jurisprudence, because he defended the institution of
slavery in the Dred Scott'8 case when the forces of history proved to
be on the other side-the side of the Union Army.
If we measure the Warren Court's efforts in terms of specifics,
they do not augur well for history's halo. As of today, we have little
more integration in the public school systems than we did when
Brown was decided in 1954. (Congressional ratification and implementation of the Court's goals may change the tide, but not soon.)
School prayers and Bible-reading are uninhibited, despite the
12. See Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MicH. L. REv. 249

(1968).
13. Sce MacKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MiCai.
L. Rm. 223 (1968).
14. See P. Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. Rrv. 269 (1968).
15. See Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"--A Note on Free Speech
and the Warren Court, 67 Mica. L. REv. 289 (1968).
16. See, e.g., Dirksen, The Supreme Court and the People, 66 MinH. L. Rav. 837, 854

(1968).
17. See, e.g., id. at 839.

18. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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Court's decisions, except in those few places where a direct judicial
mandate has been imposed or threatened. If we have achieved widespread reapportionment of state legislatures, it must be recognized
that, for the most part, the politicians rather than the people have
controlled such reapportionment. But worse, to the extent that
voting power has been shifted, it has been shifted from the rural
areas and, in some cases, the cities, to suburbia-a politically more
reactionary constituency than even the farm groups. But the success
of reapportionment is most likely to be discounted because the state
legislatures have become relatively unimportant instruments in a
country in which power is essentially divided between the national
government and the cities. Police brutality seems not to be reduced,
although a number of guilty defendants have been freed to attempt
their escapades again.
On the other hand, if one views the Court's efforts from a
broader perspective, looking at the woods rather than the trees, the
Court may ultimately appear to be much more successful. Certainly
the Court must be given credit for helping to spark the Negro
revolution that engulfs us at the moment. Certainly, too, the Court
has contributed to the egalitarian ethos that is becoming so domirant. But we do not yet know whether the Court's efforts have
enhanced the rule of law in our society or have diminished it. And
ultimately, I suspect, the verdict of history will depend upon the outcome of these three manifestations of the Court's business.
To restate my thesis then, it is too early to tell whether history is
on the side of the Warren Court. If the Court has chosen the right
side, and history credits it with contributing to that side's success,
then history may use for Earl Warren the words Holmes once used
for another jurist who, alas, has now been forgotten: "Great places
make great men. The electric current of large affairs turns even
common mould to diamond, and traditions of ancient honor impart
something of their dignity to those who inherit them."' 9 As of now,
I submit, even these words would be extravagant and premature.
19. 0. Houms, SPE-cHEs 54 (1913).

